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ABSTRACT 
 
 In the international humanitarian aid community (IHAC), a group of national, political, 
public, and private actors, there are many dichotomies. These differences range from the 
organizations’ structures to their humanitarian philosophies. One philosophical schism amongst 
the IHAC actors is the seemingly contradictory approaches of the UN’s cluster system and that 
of the Dunantist organizations. In general, this schism can be characterized as a contrast in 
humanitarian ideologies; the integrated approach, which includes political development, on the 
one hand, and strict humanitarian aid that stays removed from issues of development on the 
other.  
 It was not the focus of my research to debate the validity of these two approaches, or to 
argue that one is favorable to the other. Instead, this study examines whether or not these 
approaches can coexist in a beneficial manner. That is to say, does the schism in the approach to 
humanitarian action have a negative, positive, or negligible impact on the ability of the IHAC to 
deliver resources to those in need on the ground? After examining the various IHAC actors, 
multiple humanitarian approaches, and several field cases, this report will demonstrate how the 
integrated and strict approaches’ simultaneous and separate existence from each other helps to 
balance and improve the entire IHAC’s ability to provide assistance in many more ways and in 
many more contexts.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 The United Nations Resolution 46/182 from December 1991 states, “Humanitarian 
assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and 
impartiality” [1991, GAR]. These principles have been widely accepted as essential components 
of providing humanitarian assistance. However, the same resolution goes on to state, “emergency 
assistance should be provided in ways that will be supportive of recovery and long-term 
development” [1991, GAR]. Thus, humanitarian branches of the UN, along with their implanting 
partners, have embraced an approach to humanitarian action that integrates considerations for 
future development with early recovery assistance immediate aid in humanitarian crises. This 
combination of development (which can be politically biased) with humanitarian aid (which 
includes the principle of impartiality) is the basis for a major rift within the humanitarian 
community. As one employee of Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF) pointed out, “focusing on 
development can be contradictory to the delivery of humanitarian aid” [MSF Interview 2010]. 
Thus, organizations such as MSF and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
emphasize the importance of strictly adhering to the humanitarian principles and separating 
humanitarianism from development.  
 Before this program and this project I was admittedly ignorant of the mechanisms that 
make humanitarian action possible on a global scale. As my knowledge of this topic increased 
and I progressed through my research I became increasingly interested in the paradoxical 
approaches of the UN and Dunantist NGOs (most notably MSF and the ICRC). On one hand 
there is the UN’s cluster system, implemented in 2005, which epitomizes the integration of 
humanitarian action development. Created in order to improve the international humanitarian aid 
community’s (IHAC) coordination and leadership on broad issues (such as water and sanitation) 
in humanitarian situations, the cluster system attempts to pull all IHAC actors together, which 
include the UN, the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement (to a limited extent), and NGOs. On the 
other hand there are MSF and the ICRC, which remain outside the system. By remaining 
independent, these organizations claim to be more able to more fully perform their humanitarian 
imperative. I began to wonder if these ‘external’ players actually undermine the UN’s integrated 
approach by not participating in it? Or, more broadly and importantly, if the contrasting 
humanitarian approaches of the UN (integrated) and the Dunantists’ (strict) decreased the ability 
of the IHAC to support those in need?  
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METHODOLOGY 
 I approached this project by consulting a wide variety of sources.  First, I was privy to a 
variety of lectures from many healthcare actors in the Geneva area. These provided a broad 
context from which I based the rest of my research. Second, I used a combination of a variety of 
written works that included a collection of scholarly articles, reports from the UN, and reports 
from NGOs to demonstrate a variety of opinions on various aspects of humanitarian action. 
Third, I conducted a series of interviews with employees of organizations with varying 
humanitarian ideologies. I sought a variety of opinions and ideas and analyzed the information 
learned by identifying themes and grouping similar ideologies so as to demonstrate similarities 
and differences between approaches. 
 I will establish why and how the integrated approach and the strict/impartial approach 
compliment each other. My report will first examine the various actors in the IHAC in terms of 
their structures, procedures, policies, goals, priorities, and mechanisms. Second, it will examine 
the varying approaches in terms of their ideological basis, criticisms, and approaches. Third, I 
will introduce the case studies of Afghanistan and Haiti as examples of how both approaches can 
be beneficial. Fourth, I will examine some situations where the separation between each 
approach is blurred by concern over possible negative consequences of humanitarian action. 
Finally, I will briefly summarize and offere my reflection on what I will take away from this 
experience. 
 
RESULTS 
The IHAC Actors 
 The main descriptor and one of the strengths of the IHAC is its diversity. The community 
is comprised of three main groups: the UN, the Red Cross/Crescent movement, and NGOs. 
Though there are further layers of diversity, niches, and off-shoots within each group that further 
complicate any analysis of the IHAC, there are broad themes in terms of policies, procedures, 
structure, goals, and priorities that help demonstrate the difficulty posed by coordination. 
Therefore, this section will focus on the general similarities within each group of IHAC actors. 
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The UN 
 In general, the UN system is composed of several semiautonomous organizations that 
seek to support the overall consensus of the global, political community. The four UN 
organizations that have emerged as important players in most humanitarian emergencies are the 
World Food Program (WFP), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) [Natsios 1995]. The level of deviation amongst IHAC actors becomes clear when 
considering the varying mandates of these organizations in relation to humanitarian aid (from 
food to development). However, these ‘big four,’ as UN organizations, share certain 
characteristics that typify the UN system.  
 The most important aspect of the UN’s humanitarian organizations is their tendency to 
focus their attention on governments. This is logical considering the UN is a forum of 
governments. As a forum, the UN is a hierarchical bureaucracy. This enables the UN to interact 
well with other governmental bureaucracies, which are the UN and its agencies’ primary 
constituents. Because states are the UN’s primary constituency, the big four’s priority in 
humanitarian emergencies is to assist the state. The UN organizations “judge success by whether 
the host governments are pleased” [Natsios 1995]. In other words, the goal of UN agencies in 
humanitarian aid is to assist states. 
 Focusing on state governments influences the structure and general policy of UN 
agencies’ relief programs. For instance, most UN aid is channeled through the host governments. 
Also, the big four are not heavily involved in ‘grassroots’ programs (programs that deliver aid 
directly to people) [Natsios 1995]. The UN must cultivate cordial relations with local policy 
makers and political elites in order to ensure the host state’s compliance with the implementation 
of aid/support given. Similarly, the UN is reluctant to violate the sovereignty of a host state or to 
criticize a member state publicly [1991 GAR 46/182]. 
 Based on the UN’s state oriented approach, the creation of the cluster system reflects the 
organization’s opinion that “better global governance” is synonymous with more global 
governance [Annan, 2000]. In addition, the UN also views itself as maintaining a ‘central’ and 
‘unique role’ to provide leadership within the IHAC community [1991 GAR 46/182]. Combined, 
these two organizational beliefs form the basis for why the UN sees the cluster system as 
essential to improving the effectiveness of humanitarian response; by creating a bureaucratic 
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system that places the UN in the center of the IHAC community, the UN is fulfilling its self-
proclaimed mandate to lead through global governance. Therefore, the aspects of the UN that 
lead it to prefer a state-centered, integrated, developmental approach include its connection to 
public governments, reliance on and trust in bureaucracy, and the UN’s belief in its own 
importance as a central player.  
 
NGOs 
 In contrast to the UN, which can properly be described as representing the public sector, 
the NGO community has been described as representing the private sector. However, since the 
implementation of the cluster system, this description of NGOs is becoming less true. This is 
because many NGOs are now working as implementing partners of the UN cluster system. 
However, each NGO’s culture, history, aims, and structure are unique. In this way, the NGO 
community is much more diverse than those that operate under the UN umbrella. In fact, some 
NGOs define much of their existence by being outside the UN system.  
 The most important factor that differentiates those NGOs that implement UN programs 
and those that prefer to stay separate is funding. The large international NGOs that are able to 
raise funds from private donors and can afford to stay separate from the UN and its cluster 
system. On the other hand, the smaller national NGOs that do not have the resources or notoriety 
to attract sufficient donations must rely on receiving projects and handouts from the UN and its 
affiliates. Because international NGOs have the ability to support themselves financially, they 
are able to maintain an operational autonomy that they would otherwise not be able to.  
 Additionally, national NGOs tend to respond to humanitarian needs within their own 
region and are often involved well after the initial relief surge. International NGOs, in contrast, 
respond to various crises around the world and are usually less committed to any specific area for 
the long-term (though, in practice, this may be becoming less true across the board, most 
continue to maintain the goal of short-term interventions). While the larger NGOs address an 
international assortment of short-term interventions, national NGOs have stronger ties to a 
specific region and are more invested in the long-term status. Development (with or without UN 
guidance) is a higher priority for national NGOs than it is for their international counterparts 
because of the two groups differing foci; national NGOs are concerned with the region, 
international NGOs derive their imperative from the type of intervention.  
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  NGOs shape their programs to fit the interests of their constituency: public and 
private donors. In practical terms, this translates into most NGO funding being directly 
implemented at the field level. Because donors want to see the impact of their investment, 
minimal funds are used for research or surveillance of programs. NGOs, instead, prefer to invest 
as much as possible in tangible relief efforts. Thus, NGOs tend to be more operationally focused 
than the UN or Red Cross movement. In other words, these organizations want to translate their 
funding into as much work on the ground as is possible. These ‘grassroots’ programs and 
approaches are very popular among donors, including the UN, who like to see the “impact” of 
their donations. However, this approach to local action can create coordination issues amongst 
overlapping (or ignored) objectives, tasks, and areas of responsibility [Natsios 1995]. Therefore 
the UN has sought to organize these issues by absorbing many NGOs within the cluster system; 
whether or not an organization decides to join the system is dependent on its financial autonomy, 
their operational imperative, scale of focus, and the value they place in independence.  
 
The Red Cross/Crescent Movement 
 In his analysis of the humanitarian community, Andrew Nastios calls the Red Cross 
Movement (RCM) the “most disciplined, and best organized of the three sets of actors of the 
international relief response system” [Natsios 1995]. As the only humanitarian organization with 
a mandate under international law, the RCM is an “international organization, not an NGO, and 
yet it is outside the UN system” [Natsios 1995]. Structurally, the RCM has two major sub 
categories: the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). Together, the IFRC (who works in 
areas following natural or manmade disasters), and the ICRC (whose mandate is mainly focused 
on the assistance of victims of war) combine to provide assistance in almost every major 
humanitarian situation imaginable. 
 The IFRC states that its raison d'être is “to improve the lives of vulnerable people by 
mobilizing the power of humanity” [RCRC-History]. The IFRC seeks to accomplish this 
mandate through a global network of national societies in 186 countries. Though not part of the 
public sphere, the IFRC works closely with local governments and is committed to regions for 
long periods of time. This type of intervention demonstrates the difference between the IFRC 
and the ICRC which fiercely guards its autonomy and independence, while the IFRC has been 
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much more open to collaboration with the UN, including its role as a cluster lead in some 
situations.  
 The goals of the IFRC are to reduce the impacts of disasters and health emergencies, 
increase capacity to address emergencies, and to promote tolerance. Therefore, the broad aims of 
the IFRC are similar to the UN umbrella compared to the much more specific aims of individual 
NGOs. However, the IFRC is more like NGOs and less like the UN in that each national office is 
unique and autonomous, instead of being governed by an international body. Further, national 
offices of the IFRC are dependent on both private and public funding. Because some offices are 
not as stable financially as others, some may choose to work closer with the UN than others, 
including petitioning the UN for funding [ICRC Interview 2010]. The goal is for each national 
office to be able to implement programs in each context. While collaboration with the Red Cross 
supplies the UN and the cluster system with necessary expertise, legitimacy and a popular brand, 
IFRC offices are able to sustain themselves financially. 
 The ICRC, prefers to separate itself from the UN. Its reasons for doing so arise from the 
organization’s role in conflict. As a group that attempts to operate within, between, and among 
opposing parties in conflict, the ICRC does not want its organization to be associated with any 
political agenda which may be attached to the UN and its affiliates (for example, being pro-
western). Further, the ICRC, like the UN, is funded by international grants and has much more 
freedom than many national offices of the IFRC. For the Red Cross movement at large, whether 
the various organizations will be involved in the cluster system tends to be determined by each 
group’s operational imperative, modus operandi, and financial freedom. 
 
Determining the actors’ factors of integration 
 As can be seen above, each actor in the IHAC bases their involvement or non-
involvement with the cluster system on a set of unique criteria. Simultaneously, there are themes 
that unite the various actors and one can outline trends that influence an associations’ decision to 
operate within the cluster system or not.  
 For the UN, the cluster system is based on its belief that it is a central player in the IHAC. 
For other organizations, the decision to operate under the UN’s directions is based on factors 
such as financial autonomy, modus operandi, and scale of focus. In general, those actors that 
struggle to raise independent funding, operate less frequently in regions of conflict, and have a 
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specific area of focus or expertise in humanitarian aid are more likely to cooperate with the 
cluster system. In contrast, organizations that are capable of large funding campaigns, are 
concerned with being associated with political biases, and oversee a broad range in types and 
areas of intervention, are more likely to guard their independence. These factors not only 
determine an organization’s willingness to work in the cluster system, they help shape an 
organization’s approach to humanitarian action. 
 
The Approaches 
 The IHAC is divided into two general approaches to the delivery of humanitarian aid. 
First, the integrated approach – represented best by the UN and its affiliates in the cluster system 
– attempts to blend immediate recovery with long-term development. Second, the strict 
humanitarian approach – represented by the ICRC and MSF – focuses on the short-term delivery 
of humanitarian aid. Understanding the ideological arguments for each approach, their 
mechanisms, benefits, and limitations will help establish the basis for how these approaches 
operate in tandem.  
 
The Integrated Approach – basis and mechanisms 
 As previously stated, the cluster system is the central mechanism of the integrated 
approach. A so-called “clustering” of humanitarian aid organizations in order to supplement the 
coordination of internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps was one of several recommendations 
for humanitarian reform made in the Humanitarian Response Review (HRR) of 2005. Though 
clustering was the first humanitarian reform to be implemented by the UN, the Inter Agency 
Standing Committee (IASC) has since decided to expand clusters far beyond their original focus 
of “gap-filling” in response to IDPs to include every aspect of recovery in humanitarian action. 
Today, the cluster system is the most important mechanism in any humanitarian response venture 
[Action Aid International 2006]. 
 The HRR sought to expose, explain, and provide solutions for weaknesses in the IHAC 
that led to a slow and inadequate response in Darfur, Sudan in 2004. The review identified a lack 
of a “global vision,” leadership in IDP camps, mechanisms for accountability and measurement, 
and a particular lack of sectoral capacities and inadequate preparedness as the main failures of 
the IHAC in responding to crises. Further, the review stated a need to reconcile “sometimes 
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contradicting imperatives” among actors, that a “global vision is lacking,” and that the “time has 
come for cooperation [among IHAC actors],” though it did not suggest that the cluster idea 
should be implemented for anything beyond supplying coordination and leadership for IDP 
camps [Adinolfi 2005].  
 The “pillars” of humanitarian reforms that were implemented as a result of the HRR 
include the creation of expanded clusters, strengthening of the humanitarian coordination system, 
creation of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), and so-called “relations between the 
UN and NGOs”[ICVA 2006]. The reforms implemented by the UN are mainly focused on 
increased coordination amongst IHAC actors. As one employee at the Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) put it, the “task is to try to coordinate those 
views and perspectives [of the IHAC community] to try to come up with some sort of single 
coherent response; and that is partially what the cluster system and the whole humanitarian 
agenda was trying to do, to increase the accountability, predictability, and responsibility of those 
agencies working together in a slightly more defined direction” [OCHA Interview 2010].  
 So what else was the humanitarian agenda attempting to accomplish? The most important 
element of the evolution of humanitarian action, which has now been structurally implemented 
by the cluster system, is the recognition of the importance of long-term effects. “There is far 
more recognition that the work you do in humanitarian actions must… do no harm for the 
future,” the OCHA representative explained. “Which means you have to take into account what’s 
going on in the underlying development context of the country when you are implementing your 
humanitarian response to make sure you are not undermining development or creating a problem 
for the future” [OCHA Interview 2010]. This focus on the future, which includes the goal of a 
seamless transition from recovery to development, also tries to recognize how humanitarian 
action of certain types and at certain times can have detrimental affects on the current or future 
situation (possibly a conflict) on the ground. This approach takes into account the political 
impact of humanitarian aid instead of assuming that humanitarian intervention is always 
justified.   
 The most consequential mechanisms of the cluster system are their implementation of 
leadership and funding, which directly influence incentives. There are three ‘types’ of clusters: 
service provision, relief, and assistance [ICVA 2006]. Within those categories, clusters were 
created in areas such as food and nutrition, water and sanitation, logistics, security, and education 
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among others. Each cluster is headed by a lead agency that is accountable as the “port of first 
call,” and “provider of last resort” [Action Aid International 2006]. By providing leadership and 
a forum for agencies to discuss issues that cover broad themes, the cluster approach hopes to ‘fill 
the gaps’ in broad issues that require holistic approaches and that crosscut humanitarian 
programs. This means that implementing agencies in clusters work together to achieve the goals 
established by their leads, essentially surrendering some organizational autonomy.  
 The UN’s implementing partners in the cluster system are willing to surrender this 
autonomy because of the possible financial benefit or visa versa. As the contact at OCHA 
explained, “The original intention of having some power over funding, or over some money at 
the country level when the initial HR discussions took place was that the HC (Humanitarian 
Coordinator) had no stick and no carrot to improve coordination” [OCHA Interview 2010]. Thus, 
funding is used in the cluster system as a tool to promote the compliance of NGOs with the 
cluster leads.  
 
The Strict Humanitarian Approach – basis and mechanisms 
 Strict humanitarianism finds its philosophical basis in the humanitarian principles of 
humanity, neutrality and impartiality. These philosophical principles, along with operational 
realities in the field that differ from those organizations that subscribe to the integrated approach, 
are the foundation for arguments in support of strict humanitarianism. In terms of the 
implementation of the strict approach, the most important aspects are independence and focus on 
short-term intervention. Two of the best examples of organizations that adhere to the strict 
humanitarian approach are MSF and the ICRC. 
 When asked to describe the role of humanitarian action, one MSF employee responded, 
“The role is not to provide health for everyone. We do not try to prevent, we try to respond to 
needs. We just work on the consequences…” [MSF Interview, 2010]. Such a description 
underscores a few important beliefs of the MSF community. First, MSF is committed to limited 
intervention. As one employee from another organization described, the MSF approach can be 
equated to acting as medical “paratroopers,” first responders that supply basic health care in a 
fast, yet finite fashion. As this suggests, MSF does not view development as part of its 
imperative. “We must be humble enough to just respond,” the MSF employee continued [MSF 
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Interview, 2010]. Why does MSF feel it must only respond? That brings us to a second belief of 
the MSF community. 
 In the above context, the terms ‘limited’ and ‘finite’ refer to the type of intervention by 
MSF: providing medical assistance and ‘bearing witness,’ not the range of intervention. By 
contrast, a second important belief of MSF is that it should seek to deliver assistance to those 
who are in need regardless of race, religion, or political affiliation [About Us: History and 
Principles, 2010]. By combining these two beliefs, we can summarize the humanitarian 
philosophy of MSF can be summarized as providing medical assistance to those who are in need 
regardless of political factors.  
 In order to achieve the goals of this simple, yet problematic philosophy MSF must 
operate in a wide range of contexts. TO ensure the organization may provide assistance in 
various contexts, MSF has adopted a very strict code of independence. One could aptly describe 
its code of independence as its attempt to remain non-politicized. By remaining ‘above’ political 
discourse, MSF hopes that it will be able to work amongst all political actors regardless of their 
leaning. In essence, MSF views neutrality as central to the fulfillment of its humanitarian 
philosophy.  
 Neutrality is equally essential to the imperative of the ICRC. Because the ICRC works in 
areas of conflict, on both sides and in between the conflict, the organization must constantly 
assert its role as an independent an organization with no political agenda. “For the ICRC, in all 
contexts where we work, we are a neutral, independent humanitarian actor… for us, it is really 
important in the field because it has direct implications in terms of access.” [ICRC Interview, 
2010]. In this regard, the ICRC approach is very similar to the MSF approach; the main 
differences between the organizations’ approaches are that the ICRC focuses on victims of 
armed conflict and does pursue public advocacy in the same way that MSF does. The basis of 
strict humanitarianism is independence and neutrality, which allows organizations such as the 
ICRC and MSF to operate in various political contexts. 
 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the approaches 
 Both the integrated and strict approaches to humanitarian action present certain positives 
as well as some negatives or limits to that approach. We must understand where the borders of 
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each approach are so that we can understand how the two interact, overlap, inhibit, or 
supplement each other.  
 
The Integrated Approach 
 The integrated approach focuses on the inclusion of many actors, and recognizes “that 
different actors play very different parts in an emergency response, and all of those parts have 
actual value” [OCHA Interview, 2010]. Thus, the approach of the cluster system is a holistic 
approach that attempts to address problems from a variety of angles. In this regard, the integrated 
approach is humanitarian action on steroids, offering more than the medical assistance of the 
strict approach. This includes more than the immediate recover, but also future development. By 
involving actors, local or international, who are concerned with the future development of a 
region the integrated approach decreases the potential of humanitarian action doing more harm 
than good and addresses multiple needs with one effort. 
  A second benefit of the integrated approach is coordination, which was the basis for the 
formation of the cluster system. Both the MSF and the ICRC recognize that coordination amongst the 
variety of IHAC actors as an essential development. To quote an employee of the ICRC, “There is a role 
for the cluster system, you need some sort of coordination” [ICRC Interview, 2010]. Or, as an employee 
from OCHA put it, “I don't think anyone denies that you do need to coordinate, that you don't want to 
duplicate efforts, or that people do want to get something positive out of coordination, NGO or UN” 
[OCHA Interview, 2010]. Further, the benefits of coordination include factors such as limited overlap, 
efficiency, gap elimination, and a concentrated means of addressing humanitarian needs.  
 Despite its benefits, the integrated approach has several weaknesses. As mentioned above, the 
goal of creating the modern cluster system was to improve accountability, predictability, and reliability 
in the IHAC. There are, however, some serious concerns over whether or not clusters are capable of 
promoting such goals, or even worsen them. Questions that are raised about clusters fall in two main 
categories: theoretical and structural. While internal UN reviews have focused on clusters’ initial 
structural flaws in their initial implementation, external reviews from NGOs and third party experts have 
also found fault in the philosophical basis for clusters. Ultimately, the variety of critiques of the cluster 
system resembles the diversity in the IHAC. 
 One concern that has been raised against clusters, conveniently, is its impact on the 
diversity of actors. As the Global Humanitarian Platform (GHP) simply states, “Diversity in the 
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humanitarian sector is a strength” [Egeland 2006]. If diversity is viewed as a quality superior to 
consensus in the IHAC, the pursuit of consensus amongst cluster implementers could be 
considered a negative. Further, themes found in the cluster system, such as the promotion of a 
‘global vision,’ could be misconstrued as being anti-diversity. While the UN must balance 
diversity with the goal of ‘predictability,’ organizations such as MSF are less than concerned 
with how the cluster system could limit the ‘complimentarity’ and scope of responses [Derderian 
2007]. When asked if he was worried about the cluster’s negative impact on the diversity of 
actors, one MSF employee responded simply, “No. We can look at Haiti. In the Health Cluster 
there are over 160 actors” [MSF Interview, 2010]. Therefore, instead of the health cluster 
limiting diversity, perhaps it encourages it by supplying a framework of access for NGOs.  
  However, by becoming part of framework that is headed by the UN, NGOs 
surrender some autonomy, impartiality and neutrality. According to MSF, because the cluster 
system is a UN mechanism, it is not neutral. Despite the UN’s own profession of impartiality, 
MSF states that there is a perception in many areas that the UN pushes a “pro-western agenda” 
[Derderian 2007]. Evidence can be found to support this claim in several instances, most notably 
in Afghanistan where the UN has openly supported the Karzai regime and the American forces. 
By association, any organization linked to the UN can therefore not provide assistance to those in 
areas controlled by the Taliban. For further evidence, MSF points to the 2006 riots in Guiglo, 
Ivory Coast where “UN and NGO offices were looted and damaged, but MSF was unmolested, 
and MSF and the ICRC restarted their activities the day after the unrest” [Derderian 2007]. For 
MSF, such an example demonstrates how the cluster system can damage the effectives of aid 
through its impact on perception and neutrality. As MSF states, “perception is fragile, and crucial 
to humanitarian access and security” [Derderian 2007]. Therefore, a major limitation of the 
integrated approach is the limited access due to the safety and political concerns resulting from 
association with a pro-western agenda.  
 A further concern that has been raises against the cluster system related to autonomy is its 
impact on incentives. In general, this concern results from the unanticipated impact that cluster 
system has had on funding and donor patterns. Specifically, donors have begun to channel their 
funds through clusters at large, finding it easier on their end to give in large, lump sums. This is a 
break from the past when more funding was given directly to NGOs. This trend is potentially 
problematic due to its impact on the timeliness and fairness of funding. In addition, even though 
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competition for resources amongst NGOs has always existed, the centralization of funds within 
the hands of cluster-leading organizations alters the nature of competition amongst NGOs. As an 
MSF put it, by channeling funds through UN mechanisms, NGOs must “knock at the door of the 
UN agencies… begging for funds. And they take the money that is available and not according 
to the needs” [MSF Interview, 2010]. Thus, humanitarian action takes place where there is 
sufficient funding, in contrast to sufficient funding being raised to support humanitarian action 
where there are needs.   
 Briefly mentioned in the proceeding paragraph, increased bureaucratization is a third 
critique of the integrated approach. It is inevitable that when attempting coordination on a 
massive scale that the scale of bureaucratic procedures will expand. Specifically, bureaucracy is 
needed to regulate aspects of management such as funding. As my contact at MSF worries, “The 
UN is playing an intermediary role, which means one layer of bureaucracy added to an already 
bureaucratic system” [MSF Interview, 2010].  Additionally, there is a concern that NGOs may 
begin to mimic the UN structurally in order to work more effectively along side of it. As Smith 
and Weiss point out, organizations prefer to work with other organizations that are similarly 
structured [Smith 1997]. Elizabeth Ferris also argues that, “As [NGOs] grow and become more 
professional, they also run the risk of becoming increasingly similar to UN agencies” [Ferris 
2007]. As the employee of MSF stated, “To say that we are becoming like the UN is the worst 
qualification that you can give to MSF” [MSF Interview, 2010]. This fear results from 
bureaucracy being synonymous with red tape, delays, politicization and being disconnected from 
the situation on the ground. 
 While organizations prescribing to the integrated approach may view expanded 
bureaucracy as a necessary evil to ensure coordination, many have voiced fears of its impact on 
the ground. “In Somalia,” the MSF report on humanitarian reforms explains, “despite increased 
coordination meetings and a greater willingness to share information, cluster output is 
negligible” [Derderian 2007]. In more general terms, Andrew Natsios points to how “more 
organizational entities involved in a decision-making process [can lead to] more opportunit[ies] 
for delay, if not paralysis” [Natsios 1995]. Kerstin Martens agrees, stating that increased 
professionalisation and bureaucratisation can cause NGOs to “lose their flexibility and ability to 
give quick responses” [Martens 2001]. When one considers these criticisms of bureaucracy in 
conjunction with the goals of the cluster system (including speed and predictability), one must 
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question the UN’s tendency to equate ‘better governance’ with more governance in the 
humanitarian aid arena.  
  The final consequence of the cluster’s alteration of donor preferences is an impact on 
oversight and organizational accountability. As described above, NGOs were previously 
accountable to their private donors. These donors wanted to see the impact of their funding at the 
ground level. Therefore, while NGOs developed as implementers of grassroots projects, donors 
maintained oversight capacities in order to ensure their money was producing the most impact it 
could. With the shift in donations from NGOs to clusters, oversight has shifted from donors to 
clusters [OCHA Interview, 2010]. Therefore, NGOs are now accountable to the UN rather than 
private donors. Though MSF has raised questions about “whether NGOs should be accountable 
to the UN system” [Derderian 2007], I believe that the standardization of oversight and 
accountability is a positive development in many cases because of the limitations of many donor 
groups’ oversight capacities. If there are any tasks the UN is structured to perform well, they are 
administration, surveillance, and oversight. 
 In sum, the integrated approach, as it is expressed in the cluster system, includes several 
strengths as well as weaknesses. Specifically, the strengths of the integrated approach have been 
identified as being its holistic approach, consideration of future concerns, and the benefits of 
coordination (which includes the elimination of operational overlap, and gaps, improved efficiency, and 
a concentrated/focused means of addressing humanitarian needs). The concerns that have been raised 
over the approach are its limited access due to its politicization nature, its distortion of funding 
mechanisms, and its increased bureaucratization of humanitarian action.  
 For actors subscribing to the philosophy of strict humanitarianism, one weakness of the 
integrated approach jumps out: limited access. By definition, limited access is not an acceptable 
condition for strict humanitarians. This is because of their belief in the delivery of aid to all those who 
need it, regardless of their economic status. Therefore, strict humanitarians remove themselves from any 
political biases of the integrated approach. As stated earlier, the purpose of this is to allow movements 
such as MSF and ICRC to operate in regions of conflict or regions with complex political situations or 
conflicts. In practice this allows these organizations to supply populations with medical aid that the UN 
and its implementing partners cannot due to the safety or access concerns. Therefore, a central strength 
of strict humanitarianism is that it facilitates projects in just about any political situation, greatly 
increasing the flexibility and range of action.  
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 A further positive in this regard is the promotion of multiple choices for those in need. As Smith 
and Weiss point out, “NGOs [may] consciously seek in their activities to be alternatives to those of 
governments” [Smith 1997]. Therefore, one benefit of those NGOs that choose to operate outside the 
cluster system is their ability to act as an alternative to the public sector, thereby increasing diversity in 
choice for donors (a sort of free market competition applied to humanitarian aid). Thus, by maintaining 
action that is an alternative to the cluster system, promoters of strict humanitarianism increase the 
variety and the range of aid; acting as a check to the cluster system which is probably best understood, 
or most sincerely felt, as financial.  
 The limits of the strict approach are its definition. By limiting itself to responsive medical 
assistance, the strict approach can potentially leave gaps. Again, this is not to suggest that one approach 
is better or preferable to the other. Instead, this is simply an attempt to demonstrate that, by not being 
addressing humanitarian action in a holistic manor, strict humanitarianism does not address the causes or 
elements related to the need for humanitarian intervention. While MSF certainly acknowledges this, it is 
a perfectly reasonable critique that the organization’s mentality as ‘paratroopers’ ignores many issues 
which could be addressed along side the delivery of immediate and life saving aid. 
 All in all, the benefits of strict humanitarianism boil down to the benefits of increased access due 
to organizational independence and neutrality, as well as its function as an alternative and check to the 
public sector’s integrated approach. The weaknesses of the strict approach are mainly its limited focus, 
leaving gaps in other areas that are directly or indirectly linked to humanitarian action. By identifying 
the strengths and weaknesses of both the integrated and the strict approach, we can move to an 
examination of whether or not these approaches can supplement each other in the field.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Room for cooperation 
 By now, I have attempted to establish several broad themes related to the implementation 
of both integrated and strict humanitarianism. Primarily, these themes relate to the positives and 
the negatives of each approach. Specifically, the strengths of the integrated approach are its 
broad focus, consideration of future impacts, and the benefits of coordination while its 
weaknesses are its limited range of action due to its politicization and its structural difficulties. 
The central strength of the strict approach is its ability to operate in varying political contexts 
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whiles its main weakness is its limited focus. By examining these themes in tandem, this section 
will demonstrate how the two approaches are complimentary.  
 First, I will examine the weaknesses of strict humanitarianism alongside the strengths of 
the integrated approach. As I have argued, the strict approach’s limited focus fails to address 
many aspects related to the delivery of medical assistance, which could be addressed 
simultaneously. The best example of this is development. In reality, MSF has recognized that 
their interventions “cannot be detrimental to future development” [MSF Interview, 2010], and 
the ICRC tries to “have in mind how do we get out of this, or how does this help in the long term 
[when providing aid]” [ICRC Interview, 2010]. However, neither organization would enjoy 
being referred to as development organizations. Room remains for the transition from recovery 
to development; a transition that the ICRC stated was “crucial” in order to prevent leaving voids 
after interventions [ICRC Interview, 2010]. Additionally, an MSF employee offered, “The UN 
can play the role [of arbiter] between organizations that are more emergency oriented and those 
that are more development oriented” [MSF Interview, 2010]. Such a dialogue, he would go on to 
add, MSF concedes is necessary as well. 
 Even when organizations such as MSF “cannot accept working on a system that maybe 
could work at some point [in the future], while people are dying today” [MSF Interview, 2010], 
strict humanitarians have begun to recognize “you actually need [to include] an early recovery, 
or even a development approach [to humanitarian action]” [ICRC Interview, 2010]. As the need 
for transition from recovery to development is becoming a more and more accepted aspect of 
humanitarian action, their remains a need for the gap to be filled. The integrated approach and 
the cluster system seek to fill that gap; where the immediate recovery projects of MSF end, 
which are necessary and effective in their own right, the cluster system may facilitate the 
transition to sustainable recovery in order to mitigate harmful voids in aid. In this way, the short-
term focus of strict humanitarians and the inclusion of long-term planning in the integrated 
approach compliment each other. 
 At this point, it is important to reinforce that the preceding argument was intended to 
suggest that strict humanitarians should adopt a development imperative. This would, in fact, be 
counter-productive. As my contact at MSF argued, due to its political nature, “Focusing on 
development can be contradictory to immediate aid” [MSF Interview, 2010]. Which brings me to 
the main weakness of the integrated approach, its limited access do to its politicized nature. As 
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one OCHA employee admitted, “There are places where MSF or the ICRC can go that the UN 
cannot by virtue of being outside the mechanisms or taking a particular stance. They may also 
have a level of cooperation with the local population that, because the UN label, may be more 
difficult for some of the other organizations [to obtain]. However hard we try to work on the 
advocacy of humanitarian principles, impartiality and neutrality, [we] still are the UN, and you 
may not be able to get away from that” [OCHA Interview, 2010]. Or, as an MSF employee put it, 
“Their (the UN’s) vision is not necessarily bad. But at least, in such a context, it means they 
cannot provide assistance” [MSF Interview, 2010]. 
 Therefore, there is a gap between the politicized approach of the cluster system, its 
integrated approach and those who are in need of humanitarian assistance but reside in areas that 
the clusters have no access to. This gap can be effectively filled by strict humanitarian 
organizations. While, as MSF points out, “To work on development in places where there is still 
a conflict may not be possible [because of political factors]” [MSF Interview, 2010], the needs of 
the people in those situations still need to be addressed. The ICRC, which goes “a long way to 
make sure we are seen as separate from the UN” [ICRC Interview, 2010], and MSF can step in 
and address the needs of those who the clusters cannot reach. Therefore, the strict approach’s 
ability to access people in need that the UN’s clusters cannot helps balance-out one of the major 
weaknesses of the integrated approach. 
 In sum, despite these two views on humanitarian action’s contradictory approaches, they 
– in effect – compliment each other very well. As detailed above, the strict approach’s limited 
focus is balanced by the integrated approach’s more broad focus, and the integrated approach’s 
weakness of limited access is balanced by the strict approach’s increased freedom. Further, it 
must be reinforced that these two philosophies cannot be blended. That is to say, it is impossible 
to combine the benefits of each approach. Instead, each approach is only beneficial as a unique 
entity, separate from its counterpart. Development and neutrality are incompatible, yet they are 
both necessary benefits of humanitarian action. Therefore, the strict approach and the integrated 
approach, while they compliment each other, must remain separate from one other in order to 
provide the widest range of benefits to those in need; which is exactly the point of humanitarian 
action.  
 
Examples from the field 
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 I will now turn to two examples of how the IHAC operates on the ground, and how these 
two philosophies of humanitarianism can effectively compliment each other. First, we will 
examine Afghanistan and how the ongoing conflict affects the delivery of aid to those in need. 
Second, we will examine Haiti and how the scale of the disaster and number of actors has 
affected the humanitarian response. These examples were chosen to demonstrate the dichotomy 
of humanitarian action and how understanding the context of a situation is so vital to the 
effectiveness of aid delivery. 
 A couple days before I traveled to the MSF office in Geneva to interview one of that 
organization’s employees, it was reported that cholera had been diagnosed in Haiti. Because I 
was well aware of MSF’s criticisms (sometimes bordering on hostility) of the UN and the cluster 
system, I expected that my contact would take the opportunity to criticize the failure of the 
integrated approach in the capital of the small Caribbean state. Instead, to my surprise, he 
continually pointed to Afghanistan as an example of how the integrated approach fails. What was 
his main criticism of the UN in Afghanistan? Exactly what I have outlined above: the constraints 
that a development agenda – which is politicized – puts on humanitarian action. 
 Let me provide a brief background of the humanitarian context in Afghanistan. The 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is the operational body of the UN 
on the ground in Afghanistan. Its purpose is “to assist [the government] and the people of 
Afghanistan in laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development” [Mandate 
UNAMA, 2010]. UNAMA can be legitimately described as a supporter and working partner of 
the Karzai government, which is in conflict with the Taliban for control over the region. As an 
employee of the ICRC pointed out, “If you put all the parts of the UN together, it is hard for the 
person receiving aid to determine who is the humanitarian actor and who is the political actor” 
[ICRC Interview, 2010]. Therefore, the political actions of UNAMA are connected to other 
operations of the UN, including humanitarian assistance and the cluster system.  
 As my contact at MSF further explained, this has serious impacts on the ability of the 
IHAC to operate in the region:  
“All the UN machine, and therefore all the humanitarian agencies of the UN plus 
all the NGOs who are trying to get the money from the UN, could be considered 
as a legitimate target for the Taliban. Which means that humanitarian assistance 
provided by those organizations cannot reach those who are under control of the 
Taliban or in insecure regions...We cannot discriminate among the good and bad 
victims. In reality it means that the UN cannot, nor will it ever be able to develop 
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assistance projects in territories controlled by the [Taliban]. And those that are 
suffering under the control of the Taliban disserve just as much to receive 
assistance as those under control of the UN or Karazai regime” [MSF Interview, 
2010]. 
 
 While the UN’s integrated approach cannot reach some people, organizations such as 
MSF and the ICRC have more freedom, “MSF can work in parts of Afghanistan where many 
American and UN NGOs cannot” [MSF Interview, 2010]. The UN and its partners play the 
politicized role of promoting development and democratization (which may be crucial for 
eliminating the need for future humanitarian assistance), the ICRC and MSF play the equally 
essential role of supplying humanitarian assistance to those in need in the present context.  
 This situation in Haiti is very different from that of Afghanistan. Logically, a natural 
disaster in the Western hemisphere is going to present different challenges than a 
political/ethnic/civil conflict in the Middle East. Such varying contexts in humanitarian action 
present major challenges to the humanitarian actors. As one member of the IHAC succinctly put 
it, “Trying to impose what worked in Afghanistan on the context in Haiti is bullshit” [MSF 
Interview, 2010]. In contrast to the importance of independence as a major factor in the ability to 
affectively distribute aid in Afghanistan, the most important factor in Haiti is coordination. 
 It is my opinion that the main reason that coordination is of particular importance in Haiti 
is because of a few compounding factors: the urban setting, the number of actors/scale of 
response, and the lack of any local structure. First, the earthquake completely devastated the 
ability of the local government to function, which necessitated that external management 
mechanisms fill the void. Second, the international response to the disaster was unprecedented; 
the amount of aid workers and supplies completely overwhelmed the capacity of the Port-au-
Prince airport. Third, the relief effort was focused on a small yet densely populated area. One can 
only imagine the chaos of so many different NGOs (at one point there were over 400 in just the 
health cluster for example) attempting to operate in an urban setting with little to no 
infrastructure. As my contact at MSF summarized, “the places where coordination is most 
needed are the places where there are many actors in a very small part of the country” [MSF 
Interview, 2010].   
 In Haiti, the IHAC was presented with a situation that seems to be the perfect opportuity 
for coordination, and while Haiti was certainly not an example of perfect coordination being 
practiced (the main problem being the timeliness organizational implementation; specifically the 
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problems at the airport were brought up by each organization I interviewed), progress was made. 
“In Haiti, if you look at what the UN actually did,” an employee of the ICRC with ground 
experience in Haiti offered, “Yes, I think they came in quickly, they tried to organize quicker and 
they tried to organize more effectively” [ICRC Interview, 2010]. While the cluster system learns 
from experience and irons-out some operational/procedural/ implementation-related semantics, 
the fact remains that the actors on the ground agree that coordination is exactly what a situation 
like Haiti needs.  
 Together, these two examples outline how varying contexts can best be addressed by both 
humanitarian philosophies. Despite their contrasting approach, both approaches have strengths 
that allow them to produce positive impacts that the other cannot (or, at least, to a lesser extent). 
Therefore, the two approaches are both complimentary and necessary. Without one, the overall 
ability of the IHAC to produce positive impacts on the ground to those in need would be 
reduced.  
 
Doing No Harm 
 Having established that both the strict and integrated approaches are not combinable yet 
independently complimentary, there is one more philosophical sticking point that separates these 
two approaches that must be addressed: using (most often withholding) humanitarian aid as a 
political tool. This very controversial issue is unique because it requires the consensus of the 
entire humanitarian community; the two approaches are not independently beneficial in this 
regard.   
 The points of view of the humanitarian actors in regard to this debate reflect their views 
on the importance of immediate recovery versus future development. For MSF, their opinion is 
predictable; as my contact at MSF put it, “where the humanitarian aid is used as a tool … that is 
a problem” [MSF Interview, 2010]. The reason it is a problem for MSF is because ‘using’ 
humanitarian aid as a political tool often means withholding it from a population in order to put 
pressure on political leaders. As an example, the employee of MSF pointed to a situation in 
Angola where the UN asked MSF to stop a malnutrition project in order to put pressure on a 
political group involved in local conflict. MSF simply could not accept lives lost in the present to 
improve future possibilities.  
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 In contrast to the MSF approach, the UN has (as exemplified above) used humanitarian 
aid as a political tool in some situations. Despite the above example (and those that will follow), 
the UN does not embrace the policy fully. “Aid being used as politics? No,” explained an 
employee of OCHA, “I would personally resist it very strongly” [OCHA Interview, 2010]. 
Despite this resistance, the UN also accepts that some tough situations require some tough 
choices to be made, “But I would also say,” the OCHA employee continued, “do no harm, think 
of the consequences, know what you are doing personally” [OCHA Interview, 2010]. Thus, the 
UN always approaches a humanitarian response with the following question in mind: will 
assistance do more harm than good in the long term?  
 One example of where the UN had to face this question head-on took place about ten 
years ago in Burundi. As my contact explained:  
In Burundi, there was a huge debate in the early 2000s [because] the government 
had grouped the population into displacement camps [that had] no services what 
so ever, and then they said to the humanitarian community: “OK, now you 
provide the assistance to help these people.” One, there is a fundamental problem 
with the fact the government pursued this policy to begin with. [Second], there 
was the humanitarian imperative. If we don’t provide some assistance, the 
government isn’t going to or can only provide limited assistance. So if we don’t, 
we risk the lives of these people. What are we going to do? [OCHA Interview, 
2010] 
 Such a situation exemplifies how the delivery of humanitarian aid can be incredibly 
complex. Clearly, the Burundi example identifies how the IHAC could be justified in 
withholding humanitarian aid in order to not ‘reward’ the injurious politics of a specific 
government.  
 The problem, however, is that if the UN were to decide to withhold assistance in a case 
such as Burundi, and MSF or the ICRC decided to implement some projects of their own, the 
potential political gains would be nullified and the humanitarian gains would be lessened due to 
decreased support. This is one example where all actors must be on the same page. In the 
Burundi example, “the humanitarian community came to the agreement that they would provide 
life-saving services only. So the community did provide assistance, but they did it while making 
formal statements to the government that this is the basis on which we are providing assistance, 
these are our concerns, and we are doing it for these reasons” [OCHA Interview, 2010]. Without 
a unified approach of every actor involved, the IHAC would not have been able to produce a 
policy that could accomplish political and humanitarian aims.  
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 Finally, an example of how a disunited approach can backfire took place in the Ituri 
Province of Congo. In general, a population with needs in a region of conflict presented a 
complex situation for humanitarian actors. Specifically, despite concerns with the potential 
impact humanitarian intervention, “Organizations such as MSF or ICRC… even OXFAM said, 
‘we are going to deliver to this population because these are the ones who are being attacked and 
they need the assistance.’ They did, and it resulted in an attack on those people and the 
humanitarian community needing to pull out of the area… and it took about 3 years to get back 
into the region” [OCHA Interview, 2010]. Therefore, Ituri is an example how humanitarian 
action can do harm.  
 How does the IHAC reconcile the fact that, “Your humanitarian imperative one-day can 
risk the next five years?” [OCHA Interview, 2010] There is no answer that will address every 
situation, so every context must be examined as what it is: a unique and specific situation. In 
order to address each context individually and in a unified matter, the IHAC must be able and 
willing to participate in a constructive dialogue. Whether or not MSF or the ICRC are official 
members of the cluster system or not (and, as this paper has shown, their separation from the 
integrated approach is very beneficial to those in need), those organizations still need to be able 
to work together and alongside each other. Most importantly, humanitarian organizations must 
be willing to accept a very difficult fact: that humanitarianism does not always produce positive 
outcomes. This fact must be better understood in order to improve the overall impact of 
humanitarianism. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The Global Humanitarian Platform (GHP) distinctly sums up the paradox between the 
cluster system and the IHAC; “Diversity in the humanitarian sector is a strength,” a briefing from 
the GHP explains, “but it also makes collaborative action more difficult” [Egeland, 2006]. The 
cluster system is the UN’s response to this paradox. In effect, trying to marry diversity and 
coordination. However, the integrated approach of the UN has its limits, and does not include all 
actors, some of who prefer to remain outside the system and tout their uniqueness and separation 
from the UN. Consequently, the cluster system’s attempt at an integrated and unified approach to 
humanitarian aid is limited by the Dunantist humanitarian organizations that so fiercely guard 
their independence. I was confronted with the question: are the seemingly contradictory 
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approaches of the integrated cluster system and the strict humanitarians harmful to the overall 
delivery of humanitarian aid, or – at the very least – can they coexist?  
 The answer to that question includes, as does everything in the humanitarian field, shades 
of grey. Broadly speaking, there is certainly room for both approaches in humanitarian action, 
but I will go even further to suggest that the two approaches are complimentary and necessary 
counterparts. Possibly the best example of this is the limitations of the politicized approach of the 
cluster system that is balanced by the strict approach’s flexibility. Performing development in 
tandem with early recovery limits the ability of the UN’s cluster system to operate in some 
contexts. Yet, integrating development with early recovery may be completely justifiable and 
necessary in many situations. The independence of the Dunantist organizations that allows them 
to operate in areas where the UN is incapable relieves much of integrated approach’s negative 
consequences at the field level. With both approaches, separate and independent of one another, 
the IHAC can address the needs of any range of contexts. 
 However, the two approaches cannot remain entirely separate from one another. There 
needs to remain constant and equal (that is to say that all sides must be willing to accept their 
counterparts as equally essential to the humanitarian cause) discussion and collaboration 
amongst all IHAC actors. This need for constant communication is learned from situations like 
Ituri where performing humanitarian action may do more harm than good. Constant discussion 
amongst IHAC actors is necessary because the contexts that humanitarian actors operate in are 
constantly evolving. Genuine and sincere discussion among all actors is the only way for the 
entire IHAC to respond effectively to evolving contexts. While strict humanitarianism and the 
integrated approach compliment each other, they remain part of a larger community and must be 
willing to have frank discussions on the possible negative impacts of their humanitarian projects. 
  All in all, the humanitarian community is expanding and evolving. With improved 
technology (specifically the internet) the ways that humanitarian actors choose to implement 
their programs have changed dramatically over the years. Where humanitarianism was once 
defined by religious groups performing basic health care, modern humanitarianism includes 
everything from the causes of need to the long-term impacts that aid can have on a community’s 
development. Even actors such as MSF, who try to remain removed from development, 
coordinate with other organizations who focus on long-term programs in order to limit the 
impacts of voids left after the conclusion of emergency projects. Though the current mechanisms 
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– structured and informal – may not be perfect, a perfect system is not possible. What is positive 
is that as the IHAC learns, it also improves.  “We are all searching on how can we build on 
what’s positive,” said an employee of OCHA speaking on clusters, “because there are a lot of 
positives. As someone who worked in the agency pre-coordination, I can tell you that this is a lot 
better” [OCHA Interview, 2010].  
 However important the improved mechanisms for coordination within the IHAC may be, 
the greatest strength of humanitarian organizations remains the people who inhabit their offices 
and implement their programs in the field. It is the commitment of those individuals to improve 
the world that creates the impetus to improve the effectiveness of humanitarianism and spurs 
innovative approaches to humanitarianism. Even though the current system may not be perfect, 
as long as people remain committed to humanitarianism, the IHAC will continue to evolve and 
improve.  
 This project was a great opportunity for me to learn about the politics of immediate 
recovery, development, and humanitarianism. More importantly, it gave me the extraordinary 
opportunity to talk, discuss, and engage with enthusiastic people at a variety of organizations 
dedicated to humanitarianism. Though their opinions may have differed on the politics of 
humanitarianism, they all shared in their devotion to those in need. That is what I will remember. 
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